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ADEQUATELY REPRESENTING GROUPS
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch*
INTRODUCTION
Adequate representation and preclusion, the yin and yang of procedural
due process, depend on whether the courts treat a litigant as part of a group
experiencing an aggregate harm or as a distinct person suffering individual
injuries. And though a vast literature about adequate representation exists
in the class-action context,1 it thins dramatically when contemplating other
forms of group litigation, such as parens patriae actions and multidistrict
litigation (MDL).2 Yet, the need for adequate representation is ubiquitous.
Any time one person seeks to represent another in litigation, two questions
arise: Is the representative relationship itself legitimate and, if so, are the
representative’s decisions and actions adequate? Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides ready answers to both questions.
Certifying a class legitimizes the attorney and class representative’s
relationship with the class members and requiring a judge to approve a
settlement confirms that the representative’s actions were fair and
reasonable.3 But as class actions have gradually fallen into disfavor4 and

* Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. My thanks to Howard
Erichson, Sam Issacharoff, Nancy Moore, Ben Zipursky, and participants of Fordham
University School of Law’s Symposium on Lawyering for Groups: Civil Rights, Mass
Torts, and Everything in Between for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.
1. E.g., David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation After Stephenson:
A
Rawlsian/Behavioral Economics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J. 279
(2006); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class
Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1852–59 (1998); Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due
Process, and the Right To Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057 (2002);
Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in
Litigation and Settlement Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687 (2004); Jay Tidmarsh,
Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2009); Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005); Patrick
Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571 (1997).
2. There are a few notable exceptions such as Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation
Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486
(2012); Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict
Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985 (2011); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Quasi–Class Action Method of Managing Multi-district Litigations: Problems and a
Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 109 (2010).
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (e). Judges certify a class based on the commonality and
typicality of members’ claims such that if a class representative selfishly pursues her own
interest, the fruits of her labor will inure to absent class members.
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attorneys and commentators seek alternative means for resolving group
harms, the relative clarity of Rule 23 wanes. How should courts evaluate
adequate representation in parens patriae actions and in multidistrict
litigation? The answer to this question matters immensely since adequate
representation is critical to precluding relitigation and achieving finality.
This Article suggests that courts should differentiate between inadequate
representation claims based on the underlying right at stake. When the
underlying right arises from an aggregate harm—a harm that affects a group
of people equally and collectively—and demands an indivisible remedy,
courts should tolerate greater conflicts among group members when
evaluating a subsequent claim of inadequate representation. Because the
harm is aggregate and the remedy is indivisible (typically declaratory or
injunctive relief), if one group member receives the remedy, then they all
receive the remedy. The litigation operates to group members’ benefit or
detriment equally, so if one group member is inadequately represented, they
are all inadequately represented. Consequently, a subsequent litigant can
successfully avoid preclusion only where the lawyers or the named
representatives acted contrary to the group’s best interests or attempted to
represent an overinclusive, noncohesive group where some members
required unique relief that the representative had no selfish reason to
pursue.
Conversely, when plaintiffs suffer individual injuries at the same
defendant’s hands and unite their claims for economic or efficiency reasons,
that aggregation does not convert their individual injuries into an aggregate
harm. When counsel fails to fairly represent her client in vindicating that
harm, inadequate representation is an individual injury. In multidistrict
litigation and Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, which typically include
individuals litigating their individual harms together for systematic and
litigant efficiency, courts should look for “structural conflicts” between the
claimants themselves as well as between the representatives and the
claimants. This means that both initially and on a collateral attack, courts
should accept fewer conflicts than in cases involving aggregate rights.
Accordingly, judges should assess whether there are reasons the lawyers
“might skew systematically the conduct of the litigation so as to favor some
claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned evaluation of their
respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers
themselves.”5
This Article develops this aggregate-rights framework in three parts. Part
I begins with an overview of the consent and identity-of-interest theories
that dominate representative litigation. It concludes, however, that these
theories fail to explain a number of situations that arise in mandatory
4. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013).
5. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a)(1)
(2010).
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litigation under parens patriae statutes or in Rule 23(b)(2) lawsuits, such as
school-busing cases and Title IX litigation. Part II.A contends that
determining whether the initial underlying right at stake is an aggregate or
individual harm better explains these results. This part thus proposes an
aggregate-rights framework for distinguishing between collective and
individual rights and contends that the right to adequate representation is,
likewise, a group or individual right. Accordingly, courts should evaluate
allegations concerning inadequate representation differently depending on
whether the underlying substantive right being prosecuted is aggregate or
individual.
Parts II.B and II.C address two stumbling blocks in this aggregate-rights
framework: hybrid claims and procedural legitimacy. First, because the
aggregate-rights framework does not always impart easy answers, Part II.B
takes up the knotty situation in which the underlying right is aggregate, but
the remedies requested include individual, divisible relief. Second, because
courts accept greater intragroup conflicts in prosecuting collective rights,
Part II.C aims to improve legitimacy in litigating aggregate harms by
arguing that courts should send notice to affected absentees and allow them
to comment on the proposed remedy. Finally, Part III applies the
aggregate-rights framework to parens patriae actions and multidistrict
litigation.
I. ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH THE YEARS
Adequate representation’s theoretical underpinnings are murky at best.
In his historical work on the class action, Professor Stephen Yeazell
identified two theories that explain when one person can represent another
in litigation: (1) when the absent litigant consents and (2) when the
representative and absent litigant have overlapping interests.6 He contends
that modern Rule 23 embodies both theories in odd respects, which only
serves to confuse the doctrine:
In situations in which the drafters of Rule 23 saw relatively little value in
the interests likely to be represented in class litigation [such as negativevalue cases], the Rule requires individual notice as an index of interest,
even though in many such situations there can be little doubt about where
that interest lies. At other times the Rule requires the court to ignore
consent, perhaps because it might serve as an embarrassing reminder of
conflicting interests . . . .7

6. Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part I: The
Industrialization of Group Litigation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 514, 522 (1980) (“Sometimes it has
been argued (or assumed) that treatment of the group as a group was appropriate because all
members had consented to be treated so. At other times the members’ consent has been
thought to be unimportant because their identical ‘interests’ were being represented in the
litigation.”).
7. Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part II: Interest, Class,
and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1108 (1980).
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Nevertheless, consent and identity of interests make sense in some cases.
For example, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,8 the Supreme Court
explained that the district court could not certify a global asbestos class
action because the diverse class members had conflicting interests.9 Class
representatives could not simultaneously represent presently injured
plaintiffs and those with injuries that might materialize in the future.10
Injured plaintiffs would want to receive the largest payout possible
immediately, whereas those with injuries that could manifest in the future
would want to preserve those funds to compensate them for injuries when
and if they arose.11 Consent could not suffice either, even though the
Supreme Court interpreted consent quite liberally in Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts.12 There, the Court held that class members who do not opt out of
a Rule 23(b)(3) class have, in some amorphous way, consented to the
representation.13 But, because the global asbestos class in Amchem
included people who had simply been exposed to asbestos but had no
perceptible injury, even this tenuous link to consent was not satisfied:
exposure-only plaintiffs might not know of the exposure or might lack the
information needed to decide whether to opt out.14
Litigation initiated by a voluntary membership association also makes
sense in terms of consent and identity of interests. When people join an
organization like a union or a homeowners association they tend to do so
voluntarily (though they might face social pressure or limited housing
opportunities that force their hand). This strengthens the claims of consent.
Plus, associations litigate only matters that relate to their organization; a
labor union would not sue over homeowners association fees and
homeowners associations would not sue to vindicate workers’ rights. While
opinions within the association may vary, differences can be hashed out
within the organizational structure. So, union or homeowners association
members might vote on whether to litigate a particular matter and that
decision would bind the body as a whole. Thus, it is not surprising that
courts preclude subsequent suits by individual members and hold that the
association’s actions prevent them from relitigating.15
8. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
9. Id. at 626–27.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 627.
12. See 472 U.S. 797, 813 (1985).
13. Id. at 812; see also Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 1064–66; Henry Paul Monaghan,
Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 1148, 1168 (1998).
14. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628.
15. See, e.g., Bolden v. Pa. State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 918–19 (3d Cir. 1978)
(precluding litigation by nonminority police officers where the fraternal order of police
previously agreed to a consent decree); Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414, 425–26 (2d Cir.
1978) (finding that, because the plaintiffs were previously represented by a property-owner’s
association, they could not litigate a due-process issue); Expert Elec., Inc. v. Levine, 554
F.2d 1227, 1235–36 (2d Cir. 1977) (preventing members of a trade association from
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But not all cases make sense in terms of consent or identity of interests.
School desegregation and curfew cases provide a few good examples. In
Waters v. Barry,16 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) challenged
an 11:00 p.m. curfew that ordered all minors in the District of Columbia to
be inside after that time.17 But many of the class members and their parents
were not ACLU members and actually supported the curfew.18 They
preferred to trade their First Amendment rights for public safety.19 But
these conflicting interests did not prevent the court from certifying a Rule
23(b)(2) non–opt out class. Instead, the judge concluded that when a class
of that size was involved, “differences of opinion are unavoidable,” but
“diversity of opinion within a class does not defeat class certification.”20
Further, the court reasoned that the class representative’s interests were not
antagonistic to dissenting class members: those members could still easily
abide by the challenged curfew if they so chose—reasoning that seemed
beside the point given the dissenters’ public-safety concerns.21
The 1970s school desegregation cases faced similar problems: though
class members might all prefer to challenge a defendant’s conduct, they
disagreed over what relief to request.22 Some wanted to improve local
black schools, whereas others wanted integration.23 Still others were
against forced school busing because it required sending their children to
poor, but integrated schools and placed their children in violent situations.24
Yet, despite these important disagreements, courts continued to certify
mandatory class actions.25
Title IX cases provide an even more recent example. In Communities for
Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n,26 the court recognized the
possibility “that members of the class have no desire to pursue this action,
and are not unhappy with the status quo.”27 Yet, it reasoned that the
defendants would represent that dissenting contingent and that class
members who prefer to remain victims cannot have a disqualifying conflict
enjoining deregistration of a training program because the association was involved in
previous litigation).
16. 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
17. Id. at 1127.
18. See id. at 1131.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Thaxton v. Vaughan, 321 F.2d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 1963) (refusing to enjoin
a segregated nursing home where no affected resident was a class member).
23. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471, 476–77 (1976).
24. See generally id. at 471; Leo Crowley, Due Process Rights of Absentees in Title VII
Class Actions—The Myth of Homogeneity of Interest, 59 B.U. L. REV. 661, 666–80 (1979)
(arguing that the divergent interests in Title VII cases cause inadequate representation).
25. See David Marcus, Making Adequacy More Adequate, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 137,
142–43 (2009), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Marcus-88-TLRSA-137.pdf.
26. 192 F.R.D. 568 (W.D. Mich. 1999).
27. Id. at 574.
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on that basis.28 Moreover, to the extent that certain sports would be
competing with one another for resources, those conflicts went to the
requested relief, not liability.29 Consequently, the court rationalized that it
could designate subclasses later if need be.30
In certifying each of these suits under Rule 23(b)(2), courts assumed that
when the litigation arose out of a unifying trait that predated the litigation,
such as race or gender, cohesion existed through similar interests.31 Most
courts refused to engage in a debate over conflicting interests at all,
preferring instead to gloss over differences with empty conclusions such as,
“that the class may have included persons who support the [contested
program] does not offend the principles set down in Hansberry v. Lee,”32
and “[i]t is not ‘fatal if some members of the class might prefer not to have
violations of their rights remedied.’”33 Other courts have been satisfied if
the defendant represented the dissenters’ interest, a result that seems at odds
with Hansberry.34
These suits are puzzling from the perspective of overlapping interests and
consent. Class members’ overarching interests might align—in the schooldesegregation cases, all class members wanted what was best for their
children—but they may fundamentally disagree over how to implement that
common interest.
Moreover, Rule 23(b)(2) does not require the
representatives to send class members notice of the pending suit, so
dissenting class members may not know that they should appear and object.
Nor could their failure to opt out be considered implicit consent; opting out
is not an option in Rule 23(b)(2) classes.
Results that fail to cohere to the interest-consent theory are not limited to
Rule 23(b)(2); parens patriae suits yield similar decisions. In parens
patriae cases, the government—typically a state attorney general—sues to

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Aggregation, Community, and the Line Between, 58
U. KAN. L. REV. 889, 892–93 (2010).
32. Lanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 1349, 1357 (10th Cir. 1981).
33. Id. (quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Lord, 585 F.2d 860, 873 (8th Cir. 1978)).
34. E.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 487 (5th Cir. 1982);
Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 573 F.2d 676, 679–80 (10th Cir. 1978); Dierks v. Thompson, 414
F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1969); Cmtys. for Equity, 192 F.R.D. at 574; Messier v. Southbury
Training Sch., 183 F.R.D. 350, 358 (D. Conn. 1998); Wyatt v. Poundstone, 169 F.R.D. 155,
161 (M.D. Ala. 1995); 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1768, at 397 (3d ed. 2005) (“As long as both those
seeking to uphold and those desiring to strike the particular regulations are adequately
represented, the suit may proceed as a class action.”). In Hansberry v. Lee, the Supreme
Court held that “[t]hose who sought to secure [the benefits of the agreement] by enforcing it
could not be said to be in the same class with or represent those whose interest was in
resisting performance.” 311 U.S. 32, 44 (1940); cf. Sam Fox Publ’g Co. v. United States,
366 U.S. 683 (1961) (holding that nonparticipating association members could not intervene
because they would not be bound by the lawsuit’s result).
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protect the public interest.35 In this way, the parens patriae action assumes
some of a class action’s characteristics, and the state attorney general
mimics a class representative. This analogy holds for precluding certain
subsequent citizen suits, even though most parens patriae actions lack the
class action’s certification procedures, including the adequacy
requirement.36
For example, when the Sierra Club sued under the Clean Air Act to
enjoin Two Elk Generation Partners from building a coal-fired power plant,
the Tenth Circuit barred the suit since a Wyoming district court had already
affirmed the Wyoming Environmental Quality Council’s administrative
order allowing it.37 Similarly, courts have precluded associations and
residents from relitigating questions about implementing federal wildlifemanagement statutes,38 building cell-phone towers,39 establishing a publicrecreation easement,40 enforcing fugitive-dust emission rules,41 and
removing an abandoned dam.42
In situations like these, the government’s interests need not overlap
perfectly with the citizens’ interests; in fact, the result of a parens patriae
suit can bind the citizen even if she objects to how the government handles
the matter.43 Neither overlapping interests nor consent can explain this
outcome. The interest theory fails for obvious reasons: despite conflicting
interests, the result still binds the objector. And the consent theory set forth
in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts fails, too, since citizens typically cannot opt
out of a parens patriae action.44
35. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pa. R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1945) (permitting the state to
attempt to enjoin discriminatory freight rates). The Supreme Court has held that a state
“must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State
must be more than a nominal party” and must “express a quasi-sovereign interest.” Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). This interest might include
“the health and well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents in general” or it
could be an “interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal
system.” Id.
36. Some states have built adequacy requirements into their statutory authority for
prosecuting actions under parens patriae. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (2006) (barring
subsequent citizen suits only “if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting” an enforcement action).
37. Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners, Ltd., 646 F.3d 1258, 1265–66 (10th Cir.
2011).
38. Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 1998).
39. Lucas v. Planning Bd., 7 F. Supp. 2d 310, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
40. Citizens for Open Access to Sand & Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77,
91 (Ct. App. 1998).
41. Ellis v. Gallatin Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461, 473–74 (6th Cir. 2004).
42. Froebel v. Meyer, 217 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 2000).
43. See Lucas, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 328–29 (precluding objectors from suing to enjoin a
town from issuing telecommunications tower construction permits where the government
had already entered into a consent judgment with the cellular telephone companies).
44. One might rely on a more abstract social contract theory, however. See generally
IMMANUEL KANT, ON THE COMMON SAYING: “THIS MAY BE TRUE IN THEORY, BUT IT DOES
NOT APPLY IN PRACTICE” (1793), reprinted in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 61, 73–74, 79
(Hons Ress ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1970) (imagining that the
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How are we to make sense of these inconsistent results? Although
threads of both consent and overlapping interests underpin modern-day
cases, a doctrinal structure built around these traditional concepts fails to
offer a cohesive, explanatory theory. Worse, these concepts hold little
promise of providing guiding principles for group litigation that lacks ex
ante hurdles for adequate representation like those in Rule 23. Thus,
something more is needed.
II. INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION:
AGGREGATE VERSUS INDIVIDUAL HARM
In commenting on the consent-interest theory, Professor Robert Bone
contended that pragmatism has always helped explain representative
litigation. Consent and its resulting agency relationship, as well as goalbased interest representation, failed to capture what was best understood as
representation’s “formal effect on legal rights and duties.”45 What better
explained the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century judicial opinions
was whether the litigation was personal or impersonal. If “the remedy acted
directly on rights or duties, such as those derived from contract,” then
litigant autonomy was important, but “if the remedy acted on something
impersonal, such as the legal incidents of an impersonal status or rights in
an impersonal piece of property,” then the judgment could bind an absentee
even without an opportunity to participate.46
Historically, suits with impersonal qualities like those by a taxpayer
challenging an unlawful municipal action and even private law cases that
hinged on group rights and duties (such as one by a person who shared a
single estate with others) were bound by res judicata.47 Still, as Professor
Bone elaborated, “[a] binding representative suit did not necessarily have to
involve status-based rights or duties arising as a matter of law, provided the
remedy focused on impersonal rather than personal litigation elements.”48
For a representative suit to bind a nonparty in impersonal cases, the remedy
had to determine class members’ rights and duties—the common interest—
and each member’s interest in that remedy had to be identical.49 On the
other hand, where the remedy affected a nonlitigant’s personal rights or
social contract is not actual but imaginary, yet contending that it can obligate each citizen “as
if he had consented”); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 365 (Peter Laslet ed.,
2d ed. 1967) (1690) (contending that citizens have given tacit consent to a social contract
with the government). For examples of statutes that permit citizens to opt out, see infra note
147.
45. Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the
History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 258–61 (1990) (reviewing
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION
(1987)).
46. Id. at 263.
47. Id. at 274–77; see, e.g., McIntosh v. City of Pittsburgh, 112 F. 705, 707–08 (W.D.
Pa. 1901) (binding all property owners affected by a municipal ordinance).
48. Bone, supra note 45, at 277.
49. Id. at 279–80.
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duties as in contract or tort, courts afforded more autonomy and required
something much closer to consent.50 In these cases, the litigants sent notice
to the individuals, which essentially invited them to “opt into” the litigation.
If affected individuals chose not to participate (and had justifiable reasons
for not doing so), then the suit did not bind them.51
Although I avoid using the terms personal or impersonal, this Article
builds on these foundational concepts to construct an aggregate-rights
framework for assessing the preclusive scope of aggregate litigation. This
framework is based on the observation that what really drives the result in
modern cases is whether the initial injury constitutes an aggregate harm and
whether remedying that harm must be accomplished uniformly. When an
aggregate harm demands a uniform, unindividuated remedy, it stands to
reason that courts should preclude subsequent litigation even when the
initial representation included group members with conflicting preferences.
The key to legitimacy, however, lies in ensuring that absentees with diverse
opinions have notice and the opportunity to be heard, particularly in
shaping the relief.
A. When Is Inadequate Representation an Aggregate
Versus Individual Harm?
Aggregate harms and indivisible remedies map on to the right to
adequate representation and help answer the question of whether and when
adequate representation is a group or individual right. If adequate
representation is a group right and the group as a whole has been
represented well, then preclusion should still attach to the judgment even if
a single individual may be disappointed or aggrieved over the outcome.
But if adequate representation is truly an individual right, then a would-be
litigant could bring a second suit if the representative’s interest
Characterizing adequate
fundamentally conflicted with her own.52
representation as a group or individual right depends on the nature of the
underlying injury and the group-based characteristics of the remedy in
question. The following sections build an aggregate-rights framework for
differentiating between cases in which inadequate representation is a group
or an individual harm. Building on Professor Heather Gerken’s doctrinal
structure for identifying aggregate harms, this framework relies on the
following questions:
(1) is representation’s fairness and adequacy
measured in group or individual terms, (2) does adequate representation rise
and fall vis-à-vis group treatment, and (3) is inadequate representation
unindividuated among group members?53

50. Id. at 282–83.
51. Id. at 282.
52. See infra note 100 and accompanying text (defining structural conflicts).
53. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 1663, 1682–89 (2001).
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1. Is Representation’s Fairness and Adequacy Measured in
Group or Individual Terms?
When the underlying right at stake is an aggregate one, evaluating
fairness and adequacy in litigating that right must necessarily differ from
the metric used in an individual right.54 Thinking of these underlying rights
as falling along a continuum is helpful for two reasons.55 First, progressing
along that continuum, toward an aggregate right, tells us when the group
itself is important in understanding and prosecuting the underlying injury.56
Second, a continuum identifies the litigation’s level of voluntariness.
Aggregate harms demand aggregate remedies, thus decreasing the level of
voluntariness in any given action.
Commentators, including the American Law Institute (ALI) in its
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, claim that voluntariness is
important in determining the required degree of overlapping interests.57
The idea is that less voluntary actions should demand a higher degree of
overlapping interests than those where an individual has more participation
But this framework demonstrates that
or control opportunities.58
voluntariness is indicative for a different reason: people are drawn
involuntarily into group litigation and saddled with a case’s outcome not
necessarily because their interests are harmonious, but because the
underlying right is an aggregate one and the subsequent remedy must inure
to all or to none. Thus, as this and subsequent sections explain, the right to
adequate representation should track these distinctions.

54. Id. at 1682. Professor Gerken describes a similar continuum, though its purpose
differs from that described here. Unlike Gerken’s definition of “group” in which she intends
“‘a collection of individuals,’ not as an entity that exists separate and apart from its
members,” I intend the far end of the aggregate rights spectrum to mean an entity. In the
past, I have used two examples to differentiate between these two poles:
First, two individuals dance by a window to warn a third that the police are coming
for her. Both intend to warn and are each morally culpable for their collective
action. Contrast that example with a large corporation that has general will. The
corporation’s long-term interests are more than a sum its officers’, directors’, or
even shareholders’ desires and beliefs. In fact, those interests might even conflict.
The corporation takes on a life of its own. The dancing individuals are involved in
a simple collective and are thus ontologically distinct from a corporate entity. The
class action is more akin to a corporation than the dancers.
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1, 21 (2009).
55. For an example of a similar, but distinct spectrum, see Hazard et al., supra note 1, at
1852–58.
56. Gerken, supra note 53, at 1682.
57. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 cmt.
(b)(1)(B) (2010).
58. Id.
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Table 1

Individual
Rights

Aggregate
Rights

Remedy

Divisible
Remedy

Indivisible
Remedy

Voluntariness

Voluntary
Individual
Action

Involuntary
Joinder

Joinder Device

None

Examples

Individual
personal
injury or
other tort
claims

Rules 20,
42
Bus
accident
involving
20 people

MDL
Mass
Torts

Rule
23(b)(3)
Securities
Class
Actions

Rules 23(B)(1),
23(B)(2)
Desegregation
Title VII
Employment
Discrimination,
or Civil Rights
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A purely individual right, such as a negligence claim arising from a runof-the-mill car accident, can be proven without referencing other car
accidents across the state.60 That other drivers also have accidents is
largely irrelevant. Similarly, in a bus accident involving twenty people, any
one of those individuals can prove her negligence claim against the bus
company and its driver without including the other passengers. Yet, the
passenger might find it economically or pragmatically advantageous for her
attorney to represent the other passengers too. Presenting other passengers’
injuries could buttress jury sympathies and increase potential settlement
value. The judicial system might also determine that consolidating
passengers’ suits under Rule 42 furthers judicial and litigant economy.61
As we progress toward the middle of the continuum, values like judicial
economy and convenience begin to crowd the traditional emphasis on
individual participation and autonomy. So, in a mass-tort case, for
example, a single pharmaceutical company manufactures a drug that harms
thousands of people by causing heart attacks and strokes and fails to warn
them of these risks. Just as in an individual-rights case, a consumer could
prove her failure-to-warn claim without referencing other consumers. But
as 30,000 other users file suit, collectivization begins to take hold.62 The
59. Corporations are treated as a legal entity distinct from the individual members. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 59, at 93 (1982) (“Except as stated in this Section,
a judgment in an action to which a corporation is a party has no preclusive effects on a
person who is an officer, director, stockholder, or member of a non-stock corporation . . . .”).
60. See Gerken, supra note 53, at 1683.
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 42.
62. See Hazard et al., supra note 1, at 1853 (noting that “persons associated merely by
the fact of their common victimization have some legal connections among themselves,”
such as “being made the beneficiaries of issue preclusion” and being “limited to
proportionate recovery where only a limited fund is available to satisfy their claims”).
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attorneys working on a contingent fee consider it economically
advantageous to represent as many consumers as possible. The judicial
system regards it far more efficient to coordinate these actions before the
same judge through multidistrict litigation. And the defendant, though it
may seldom admit it, finds it useful to displace plaintiffs from their chosen
fora, defend itself systematically in a single forum, and reach a settlement
that encompasses as many consumers as possible.63 Still, no question exists
as to who receives the remedy: the consumer herself.
Yet, as the number of litigants increase, an individual cannot participate
as effectively; her case is intertwined with many others like it.64 A handful
of bellwether trials may set a range of settlement values for thousands of
cases. And though individuals technically retain the right to accept or reject
a settlement, consent is diminished through various settlement clauses that
allow the defendant to withdraw the offer if too few claimants agree or that
obligate participating attorneys to recommend the deal to one hundred
percent of their clients.65
Practicality’s importance increases the further the continuum progresses
toward aggregate rights. Just as litigants establishing general causation
against the pharmaceutical company would rely on much of the same
evidence in proving their claims, so too would plaintiffs bringing a Rule
23(b)(3) securities-fraud class action. Technically, however, securitiesfraud plaintiffs could still bring these suits individually and the remedy still
goes directly to the injured party. That is, the remedy is divisible among
claimants.66 But the claim’s value might be too small to litigate
individually, meaning that the investor has less interest in prosecuting her
own case, and a class might be the only way to make the litigation’s
economics worth pursuing. Nevertheless, if she wanted to, an investor
could opt out of the class and litigate on her own.
Voluntariness wanes and practicality emerges as the guiding tenet as we
come to mandatory class actions under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2).67
Consider again the 1970s school desegregation cases. Those suits sought
63. See Burch, supra note 4; see also, e.g., Julie A. Steinberg, Pharmacy Supports MDL
for Meningitis Suits but Disagrees with Plaintiffs’ Forum Choice, 13 Class Action Litig.
Rep. (BNA) 1297 (Nov. 23, 2012).
64. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass
Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 40–43 (2009).
65. See generally Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus
Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265 (2011).
66. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04(a) (2010)
(“Divisible remedies are those that entail the distribution of relief to one or more claimants
individually, without determining in practical effect the application or availability of the
same remedy to any other claimant.”).
67. The American Law Institute has treated these two class action categories in much the
same way. Id. § 2.04 cmt. a, at 123 (“Courts, in short, have not succeeded in giving any
distinct meaning to Rule 23(b)(1)(A) by comparison to Rule 23(b)(2).”). Rule 23(b)(1)(B),
known as the limited-fund class action, is likewise treated as a mandatory class for equitable
reasons.
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injunctive relief in the form of integration and busing—relief that would
yield a uniform result regardless of whether a single individual or an entire
group sued.68 In that sense, the relief was indivisible among the class
members.69 Similarly, in a Title VII employment discrimination class
action seeking to enjoin discriminatory behavior, the remedy is collective,
at least as to the injunction and the declaratory judgment.70 Moreover,
proving a discriminatory pattern or practice requires the judge to examine
not only a given individual’s injury but also how the employer treated that
person or that group of persons as compared with other workers. Looking
solely at how an individual is treated proves little in the way of a pattern or
practice. So, the underlying evidence needed to evaluate the claim arises
from the group context.
Now compare a client’s dissatisfaction with her attorney in three different
scenarios and note how the group matters more or less when that
dissatisfaction arises out of an individual car accident versus a failure-towarn claim in multidistrict litigation versus a Rule 23(b)(2) employment
discrimination class action. The way in which counsel represented other
group members becomes increasingly relevant as the underlying right at
stake increasingly concerns an aggregate harm.
First, in the car-accident case, because individuals control the litigation
and can hire and fire their attorneys, client dissatisfaction would typically
take the form of a bar complaint or a malpractice action. The client might
allege that her attorney engaged in overreaching, exercised undue influence,
or failed to discharge procedural or ministerial duties.71 The evidence she
offers would refer solely to the attorney’s handling of her particular case;
how that or other attorneys had litigated other car accidents would have
little relevance.72
Second, in the multidistrict failure-to-warn claim, an individual’s
grievance against her attorney may reference other cases. She might feel
68. See John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1419, 1433 (2003).
69. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04(b)
(“Indivisible remedies are those such that the distribution of relief to any claimant as a
practical matter determines the application or availability of the same remedy to other
claimants.”).
70. When Congress enacted Title VII, the remedial menu included a declaratory
judgment that the defendant violated the Act and an injunction to prevent the defendant from
continuing to discriminate. The Supreme Court added the availability of back pay in 1975
and Congress permitted compensatory and punitive damages in 1991. See Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 1977A(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072; Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
71. See, e.g., Mavity v. Fraas, 456 F. Supp. 2d 29, 34 (D.D.C. 2006) (failing to file an
exhibit before the trial deadline); In re Belmar, 319 B.R. 748, 755 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2004)
(failing to file pleadings); Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 678 A.2d 1060, 1067–68 (N.J.
1996) (providing erroneous advice). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (2000).
72. To be sure, the standard of care in a legal malpractice case is the care that a similarly
situation lawyer in a similarly situated case would provide.
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that she received less than she deserved in a settlement after learning that
other plaintiffs received more. Or, she might be upset at the way her case
was managed; attorneys might have tried other cases with stronger claims
or less difficulty in establishing specific causation before hers.73 Either
way, she compares her treatment vis-à-vis others’ treatment. Alternatively,
a client’s representational concern might focus on whom the judge appoints
to a plaintiffs’ steering committee. Because a steering committee
spearheads the litigation and conducts settlement negotiations, it wrests
control away from a plaintiff’s chosen attorney. But a committee’s makeup might not reflect a fair cross-spectrum of the plaintiffs’ diverse
interests.74
Finally, in a gender discrimination class action under Rule 23(b)(2) that
seeks injunctive relief, if a class member collaterally attacked the settlement
by claiming that the representative failed to adequately portray her interests,
the court would necessarily examine how the attorney treated the class as a
whole.75 After all, a class-action attorney must represent the interests of the
entire class and prove “the existence of a class of persons who have
suffered the same injury” that reveals a “policy of . . . discrimination”
reflected in defendant’s employment practices.76 The disgruntled employee
might have preferred not to litigate at all, to litigate by herself, or to request
an entirely different remedy.77 But her individual choices have been
restricted by practical necessity. She is part of a collective that includes
everyone else with similar claims against the company; she has no option to
opt out.78 Some federal courts even require litigants to bring pattern-orpractice cases as class actions.79 Thus, a subsequent court should find
representation inadequate only if counsel’s conduct proved detrimental to
the group as a whole. Pragmatically, stifling these conflicts through
subsequent group-based preclusion prevents conflicting remedies and
ensures two-way preclusion, for both defendants and plaintiffs.80 In short,
courts measure adequacy and fairness in group terms.
73. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal
Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 98 (2011) (describing Betty Mekdeci’s situation in the
Bendectin litigation where attorneys refused to relitigate her case so that they could bring
stronger cases first).
74. See infra Part III.B.2.
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4).
76. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157–58 (1982).
77. See Note, Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title VII Suits, 99 HARV. L. REV. 619,
632 (1986).
78. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2), (3).
79. E.g., Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 760 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated
on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 866–67
n.6 (7th Cir. 1985); accord Celestine v. Petroleous de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355
(5th Cir. 2001). The rationale is that injunctive relief is indivisible, thus any litigation
inherently affects the group and should be pursued as group litigation. See Allen v. Int’l
Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 470 (7th Cir. 2004).
80. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04 cmt.
A (2010).
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In sum, courts should evaluate grievances against attorneys differently
depending on whether the underlying substantive right being prosecuted is
aggregate or individual. When an individual in a car accident chooses to
sue and then feels that her attorney failed to protect her interests, courts
evaluate inadequacy purely based on the attorney’s conduct in representing
that person.81 How that attorney or another attorney has treated other caraccident victims is largely irrelevant to this victim’s malpractice claim.
Moreover, because she has the authority to hire and fire her attorney, that
step is typically her simplest recourse given the difficulty of proving
attorney malpractice.82 By contrast, the employee swept up in a Rule
23(b)(2) gender-discrimination suit requesting injunctive relief may not
have chosen to sue at all and might not even know that the suit was
pending. Her ability to participate in and control the suit is minimal at best.
When she attempts to sue later for gender discrimination and the defendant
raises preclusion as a defense, the court will likely consider an inadequate
representation allegation in group terms. So long as class counsel
adequately represented the class members as a whole, she should be
prevented from relitigating individually. Fairness and adequacy are
necessarily measured in group terms.
2. Does Adequate Representation Rise and Fall
Vis-à-vis Group Treatment?
When adequate representation qualifies as a group right—that is, in cases
where the underlying cause of action is likewise aggregate—a group
member cannot prove she was inadequately represented except by showing
that counsel treated the whole group unfairly. Just demonstrating that class
members do not have identical interests does not establish inadequate
representation so long as “substantially all of plaintiffs’ interests were
vigorously presented . . . by the various parties.”83 Thus, courts are
unlikely to allow a second action to proceed unless counsel in the first
81. Of course, the standard of care in a legal malpractice case is the care that a similarly
situated lawyer in a similarly situated case would provide, but the individual here is not
referencing a group of clients that are suing or being represented in concurrent lawsuits.
82. Malpractice claims based on errors in conducting litigation are sometimes difficult to
prove because there is an exception for an honest exercise of professional judgment. Paul v.
Smith, Gambrell & Russell, 599 S.E.2d 206, 208–09 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); see also Noske v.
Friedberg, 713 N.W.2d 866, 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). Nevertheless, certainly there can be
liability for failure to meet a deadline. The difficulty with encouraging clients to fire their
attorneys is that lay clients are often incapable of monitoring their attorney’s conduct. So,
while hiring and firing an attorney is the simplest recourse to this issue, it is not always a
feasible option.
83. Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 573 F.2d 676, 680 (10th Cir. 1978); see also Brown v. City
of Barre, No. 5:10-cv-81, 2010 WL 5141783, at *7 (D. Vt. Dec. 13, 2010) (noting that even
if class member lessees wanted to bring individual suits against their landlords for defaulting
on their water bill rather than from the city, all members would benefit from an order barring
the city from disconnecting the water service and “speculative disagreement about litigation
strategy alone” did not render the class representation inadequate).
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action was inept or failed to loyally represent the group. A subsequent
claim could also escape preclusion if a class representative secured a better
deal for herself than for the rest of the class84 or purported to represent a
poorly defined class that was either not cohesive or included both alleged
victims and aggressors.85 In short, a defendant invoking preclusion as a
defense in a second case can overcome a claim of inadequate representation
by showing that the representatives in the first case treated the rest of the
group fairly.86 Or, if the court agrees with the plaintiff and finds that
counsel inadequately represented the whole group in pursuing an aggregate
harm, then any group member—regardless of whether she was satisfied
with the initial representation—should be able to sue again.
Precluding subsequent actions where the underlying harm is aggregate
makes some sense historically. In tracing the modern-day class action back
to its medieval roots where people lived within rural villages and religious
parishes comprised the “community of the vill,”87 Professor Yeazell found
that each community member shared in the duties, privileges, and
obligations of villeinage membership.88 Community members were jointly
liable for any duty that might principally be assigned to just one of them.89
Accordingly, manor courts routinely imposed collective liability on villages
for shared obligations, often regardless of who was individually responsible
for an act like trampling crops.90 Although they came to collectivity in a
different way, those living in medieval towns voluntarily formed highly
cohesive merchant guilds, craft guilds, and boroughs through social

84. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 852 (9th Cir. 2000); Brown v.
Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 390 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig.,
248 F.R.D. 389, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Foster v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 229 F.R.D. 599, 604 (D.
Minn. 2005); cf. Martin v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 198, 203–04 (W.D. Tex.
2004) (finding class representatives inadequate because they failed to bring all potential
causes of action available to putative class members).
85. See, e.g., Moore v. Napolitano, 269 F.R.D. 21, 34 (D.D.C. 2010) (denying
certification because the putative class included both people who alleged discrimination and
their supervisors, the alleged discriminators); King v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 231 F.R.D.
255, 264–65 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (denying certification, in part, because supervisory class
members could be called to refute other class members’ allegations); Talley v. ARINC, Inc.,
222 F.R.D. 260, 269 (D. Md. 2004) (denying certification, in part, because some class
members were managers in the human resources division and handled other members’
discrimination complaints); see also infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text (discussing
Falcon).
86. See Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 677 F.2d 471, 489–90 (5th Cir. 1982)
(finding that antagonistic interests among the class members did not render representation
inadequate); Williams v. Lane, 96 F.R.D. 383, 386 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that class
members would be adequately represented even if they disagreed as to what relief to request
because they all had an interest in having prison conditions declared unlawful and members
would have the opportunity to comment on the relief).
87. See YEAZELL, supra note 45, at 41–48.
88. Id. at 42–52; see also Bone, supra note 45, at 219–20.
89. YEAZELL, supra note 45, at 48 (quoting PAUL VINOGRADOFF, THE GROWTH OF THE
MANOR 318–19 (rev. 2d ed. 1932)).
90. Id. at 50–51.
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bonds.91 As phrased by Robert Bone, “Obligation and privilege attached to
the group qua group, with the group allocating the burdens and benefits
among its members. Moreover, each group member was individually liable
for the entire group obligation and had to resort to internal group
mechanisms to spread the burden.”92
Of course, the types of harms that we consider aggregate harms today are
quite different from those in medieval times. If someone in a modern-day
neighborhood tramples someone else’s garden in another community, the
whole neighborhood is not responsible. Yet, the fundamental principle of
an aggregate harm remains the same: a collective quality exists in the relief
sought. Thus, in both old and new situations involving aggregate rights, a
group member cannot subsequently claim that she was inadequately
represented in pursuing that right unless she proves that counsel treated the
whole group unfairly.
3. Is Inadequate Representation Unindividuated Among Group Members?
Finally, inadequate representation claims differ when the underlying
harm is aggregate because a court cannot distinguish those who are harmed
by the litigation’s mishandling from those who are not. That is, the injury
caused by inadequate representation is unindividuated among those
represented. Aggregate harms, like housing-desegregation or school-busing
cases, typically necessitate an indivisible remedy such as an injunction or
declaratory judgment. Each group member has an equal stake in pursuing
an indivisible remedy and each benefits from (or is harmed by) the relief
equally. While each member has standing to bring a claim, no member has
the right to an individual outcome independent of the other group
members.93 It likewise makes sense that when counsel or a class
representative spoils that effort, the group experiences inadequate
representation equally.94 And when the lawyer’s efforts lead to a positive
change in policies or practices, then that change—in theory at least—helps
all of the group members, regardless of whether they wanted to sue in the
first place. By this thinking, in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, the class
representative matters very little; the group members should be
interchangeable.
Take, for example, the Supreme Court’s decision in General Telephone
Co. v. Falcon.95 Mariano Falcon, an employee claiming his employer
91. Id. at 42–44, 58–60.
92. Bone, supra note 45, at 220.
93. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 1059.
94. See id. at 1058 (“[I]n cases for injunctive relief against institutional conduct, it is
difficult to conceptualize an individual right of autonomy, even where we would no doubt
recognize an individual’s ability to bring a claim in court. In such circumstances, an
individual may be an exemplar of the harm visited by allegedly wrongful institutional
conduct, but that same individual cannot claim an autonomous right to separate control of
the outcome of the legal challenge.”).
95. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
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discriminated against him in denying his promotion, could not also
represent other Mexican Americans who had not been hired.96 The
underlying claim could be considered either an aggregate or an individual
harm, depending on the allegations. Mr. Falcon could have sued for
discrimination individually and his claim would have focused specifically
on his failed promotion. There would be no need to reference how General
Telephone treated other Mexican Americans to prove that it discriminated
against him. Or he could have (as he did) brought a disparate-treatment
claim on behalf of all Mexican Americans working at General Telephone
Company who were denied promotions. In that case, the evidence would
focus on how General Telephone promoted whites compared with Mexican
Americans. The baseline for measuring fairness depended on this
comparison.
The problem, of course, was that Mr. Falcon tried to represent both
Mexican Americans who had been denied promotions and those who had
not been hired: two groups that were not sufficiently cohesive. Rule 23
presumes the representative is self-interested and that, because his interests
are typical of the group’s interests, he will benefit the group by selfishly
pursuing his own agenda.97 The concern then was that Mr. Falcon, as a
current employee, had no self-interested reason to care about hiring.
Moreover, the two claims required different facts; evidence as to how
General Telephone discriminated in promoting employees would not
illuminate facts about how it discriminated in hiring. Thus, “Mexican
Americans,” as a defined group, were not interchangeable. Remedying
discriminatory promotion practices would not necessarily remedy
discriminatory hiring practices. Based on this logic, had the overarching
class been certified, a Mexican American who was not hired for
discriminatory reasons could bring a subsequent suit and allege inadequate
representation in the first action. That harm is an aggregate harm that all
Mexican Americans who would have been hired, but for the discrimination,
share.
By contrast, poor representation in pursuing individual harms can be
individuated among group members. Group members are not fungible or
interchangeable for liability or remedial purposes.98 If a drug company
fails to warn patients of the risks of a heart attack or stroke associated with
its pain reliever, patients experience that harm differently. Some will have
no adverse effects, others will experience a heart attack or stroke and
recover, and others will not recover. Though each patient shares common
facts with one another based on the labeling, they have different genetic
96. Id. at 158–59.
97. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05, cmt. h
(2010) (“By acting in ways that help themselves, these parties should help others
automatically.”).
98. See Gerken, supra note 53, at 1687 (contrasting the unindividuated harm in vote
dilution cases from the individuated harm in a classic rights suit).
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predispositions, may receive unique information from their doctors, and
will ultimately have to prove specific causation as well as general causation.
Consequently, all group members are not injured equally from the
mislabeling and it would not necessarily be inconsistent to award damages
to one patient and not another.
When counsel represents numerous tort victims seeking divisible
remedies in situations like the failure-to-warn scenario, it is possible for a
settlement to benefit some at the expense of others and for some to have a
valid grievance against their attorney whereas others do not. This was one
of the problems in Amchem: attorneys cut a better deal for their “inventory”
plaintiffs (their current clients) than for those who had not yet sued.99 The
inventory plaintiffs were thus better off than their future counterparts and
the court could have readily sorted those whom the inadequate
representation injured from those whom it did not.
*****
Thus far, we have differentiated between how courts should handle
preclusion in subsequent lawsuits depending on whether the underlying
injury in the first action was an aggregate harm. When the underlying claim
flows from an aggregate harm, it follows that inadequately representing one
group member in prosecuting that harm is the same as inadequately
representing the whole group. The harm is aggregate and the remedy—
typically declaratory or injunctive relief—is likewise indivisible. If one
group member receives the remedy, then they all receive the remedy. If one
group member is inadequately represented, then they are all inadequately
represented. It makes sense practically (if not theoretically) that courts
tolerate greater conflicts among group members when evaluating a
subsequent inadequate representation claim. Successful claims of this sort
tend to be those where the lawyers and, potentially, the named
representatives acted contrary to the group’s best interests or, as in Falcon,
tried to represent an overinclusive group where some members would
require a remedy that the representative had no selfish reason to pursue.
Conversely, when litigants each suffer individual harm at the hands of
the same defendant and decide to pool their claims together for economic or
other functional reasons, that collectivization does not change the nature of
the underlying individual harm. When counsel poorly represents an
individual in litigating that harm, inadequate representation is an individual
injury. Another way to think about this distinction is from a remedial
standpoint. When a remedy adheres to the notion “if as to one, then as to
all,” as is the case in indivisible remedies, then an inadequate representation
claim likewise rises and falls with the group. But divisible remedies tend to
be different. Inadequately representing one group member in demanding
damages, for example, does not automatically mean that the rest of the
99. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 600–01, 606, 626–27 (1997).
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group was harmed. In fact, some members might benefit from others’
inadequate representation, as was the case in Amchem. Here, courts should
look for “structural conflicts” between the claimants themselves, and the
representatives and the claimants.100
There are, however, some stumbling blocks to a dichotomy based on
distinguishing between whether the underlying right at stake is aggregate or
individual and then characterizing a subsequent inadequate representation
claim along similar lines. First, it does not address how courts should
handle inadequate representation in circumstances where group members
experience an aggregate harm but request both divisible and indivisible
remedies. Second, it does not consider the unfairness of a situation in
which group members suffer an aggregate harm but receive no notice of the
pending suit and may have vastly conflicting opinions about which
remedies to request. The next two sections consider each problem in turn.
B. Inadequate Representation in Hybrid Claims:
Aggregate Harms, Divisible Remedies
How should a court handle subsequent inadequate representation claims
in cases where the underlying harm was aggregate but the requested relief
included both indivisible and divisible remedies? For example, when
employees file gender discrimination claims under Title VII, they typically
request declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent future discrimination.
Yet, Title VII also allows them to demand compensatory and punitive
damages, damages that are divisible among the class members but flow
from the aggregate harm.101 Similarly, if an industrial plant taints a
community’s groundwater, the harms—the release of the chemical and the
potential for future emissions—prompt aggregate remedies of declaratory
and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs want an indivisible remedy to enjoin
subsequent emissions and a declaration as to the clean up. But some people
may experience more harm than others; they might live closer to the plant
and face greater personal injuries or property damage as a result.
In both of these examples, the underlying harm is aggregate, but
recovering monetary damages for the way in which that harm has affected
each individual demands proof of specific causation. If a court evaluated
counsel’s representation solely in pursuing the aggregate harm—gender
discrimination or groundwater contamination—it would allow for greater
100. See generally AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION
§ 2.07(a). A structural conflict is a conflict of interest either between the “claimants and the
lawyers who would represent claimants on an aggregate basis” or
among the claimants themselves that would present a significant risk that the
lawyers for claimants might skew systematically the conduct of the litigation so as
to favor some claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned evaluation of
their respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers
themselves.
Id.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1), (b) (2006).
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conflicts within the represented group. A judge would measure fairness in
group terms, considering whether counsel treated the rest of the group
members fairly and, if not, all group members would have been
inadequately represented. By contrast, if a judge looked solely at counsel’s
work in pursuing divisible remedies and found that class members’ interests
were antagonistic to one another (counsel represented plaintiffs with present
injuries as well as those who had merely been exposed to the contaminated
groundwater and might develop future injuries), then she would be more
likely to permit a collateral attack.
These scenarios—a Title VII pattern-or-practice case demanding
compensatory and punitive damages and a toxic-tort case requesting
divisible and indivisible relief—raise several issues for a plaintiff
subsequently claiming inadequate representation and for courts using this
aggregate-rights framework to decide her claim. First is the problem of
characterization. As the punitive damages claim illustrates, it is not always
easy to pinpoint whether the underlying claim in question is aggregate. One
solution is to subject each questionable claim to the same rubric used here
for distinguishing between aggregate and individual rights. As Professor
Gerken used to explain the voting-dilution cases and I have refashioned to
distinguish between inadequate representation claims, there are at least
three differences between aggregate and individual rights. First, when a
right is aggregate, “fairness is measured in group terms,” even if the harm
itself injures an individual.102 Second, an aggregate right “rises and falls
with the treatment of the group.”103 Third, an aggregate right “is
unindividuated among members of the group; no [group member] is more
or less injured than any other [group member].”104
Applying this framework requires understanding both the law
surrounding the remedy at stake—let’s consider punitive damages—and the
law governing the underlying right—Title VII, for example. By some
reasoning, punitive damages seem to remedy an aggregate harm at least
when plaintiffs request them based on the defendant’s conduct toward the
whole class.105 Punishing a defendant’s pattern of discriminatory behavior
toward women, for instance, hinges on whether plaintiffs can establish the
underlying wrong to the group as a whole by proving the same
102. Gerken, supra note 53, at 1681–84.
103. Id. at 1684–86.
104. Id. at 1738.
105. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 622 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d,
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 3:08CV540-RJC-DSC, 2010
WL 143725, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 7, 2010); Olvera-Morales v. Int’l Labor Mgmt. Corp.,
246 F.R.D. 250, 258–59 (M.D.N.C. 2007) (noting that, because plaintiffs requested punitive
damages based on “the Defendants’ conduct to the putative class as a whole,” there was no
need to contemplate “the intangible, subjective differences of each class member’s
circumstances”); Brown v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 08 C 5908, 2011 WL 1838741, at *6–7
(N.D. Ill. May 11, 2011) (certifying a hybrid class, but providing only a cursory explanation
of why compensatory and punitive damages do not undermine the predominance of common
questions); Palmer v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 217 F.R.D. 430, 439–40 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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discriminatory act or series of acts.106 That necessitates evidence of
discriminatory, company-wide practices and policies where the punitive
damages claim rises and falls with the way the defendant treated the group.
Yet, even though punitive damages seem instinctively like an aggregate
remedy because they address the defendant’s conduct toward a protected
group, recent Supreme Court cases on punitive damages and Title VII
suggest that punitive damages may be individual, divisible remedies.107
Title VII allows for up to $300,000 in punitive damages for each employee
but requires plaintiffs to show that the employer engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination “with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.”108 Thus, some have
argued that Title VII should be interpreted to preclude punitive damages on
a class-wide basis unless plaintiffs show individualized injuries.109 When
courts conduct a fact-specific inquiry into whether each class member
would be entitled to those damages, it is entirely possible that some
members would receive them and others would not.110 Punitive damages
would thus be divisible among the claimants and would not rise and fall
with the defendant’s treatment of the group. If courts cannot award
punitive damages under Title VII without determining whether each
employee is eligible and those awards punish the defendant’s wrongdoing
only as to a particular plaintiff,111 this implies that punitive damages
remedy an individual harm and count as divisible remedies.
The Supreme Court’s punitive damages decisions lend further support to
this view. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell,112 Philip
Morris USA v. Williams,113 and Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker114 can each be
read to suggest that punitive damages remedy individual injuries.115 The
upshot of Williams is that punitive damage awards can punish the
defendant’s wrongdoing only as to a particular plaintiff, not as to those
similarly situated.116 Exxon Shipping and State Farm both indicate that
punitive damage awards must be tethered to compensatory damages (or, at

106. See, e.g., Palmer, 217 F.R.D. at 438 (focusing on the defendant’s conduct as
opposed to the class members’ individualized harms); cf. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.,
151 F.3d 402, 417 (5th Cir. 1998) (refusing to decide whether punitive damages are
available on a class-wide basis).
107. See, e.g., Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 358, 379–80 (E.D. Ark.
2007).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1), (b)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
109. E.g., Allison, 151 F.3d at 417 (noting that the plain language of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 could be interpreted this way, but declining to reach the question).
110. Nelson, 245 F.R.D. at 379.
111. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011); Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353–54 (2007).
112. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
113. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
114. 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
115. Nelson, 245 F.R.D. at 376.
116. Williams, 549 U.S. at 353–54.
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the very least, backpay).117 Given that courts can no longer award backpay
under Title VII without determining whether each employee is eligible,118
the fairness of awarding punitive damages would be measured in individual
terms. Likewise, it is possible to award punitive damages to some group
members and not others. Consequently, punitive damage claims could be
considered individual claims.
Trying to situate punitive damage claims within the aggregate-rights
framework brings up a second problem: How should courts characterize
subsequent inadequate representation claims where the initial litigation
concerned an indisputably aggregate right, but requested both divisible and
indivisible remedies?
There are at least two potential solutions to this complication. First,
courts faced with inadequate representation allegations might closely
examine the specific facts to pinpoint whether the deficiency turns on the
handling of divisible or indivisible remedies. If the claim arose out of how
counsel represented the group in litigating indivisible remedies, then
intragroup conflicts would be more tolerable. The plaintiff would need to
explain either how the representation hurt the group as a whole or how, as
in Falcon, the initial group was poorly defined and not cohesive.119
Alternatively, if divisible remedies were involved, then plaintiffs must have
had an opportunity to exit the litigation120 and, as Amchem requires, the
litigation must have been free both from intragroup conflicts and structural
conflicts between the representative and the group.121
Yet, in practice this ex post solution is problematic. The dividing line
between types of relief may be clear enough, but when counsel represents
plaintiffs in pursuing an aggregate right and requests both divisible and
indivisible remedies, the representation itself cannot be segregated so
easily. Tradeoffs are inevitable. The defendant might be willing to institute
new practices that prevent future aggregate harms like sexual harassment
policies, less subjective promotion criteria, or pollution contamination
measures in exchange for reduced compensatory or punitive damages.

117. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 514 (2008); State Farm, 538 U.S. at
423 (2003); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Nine Lives: The Punitive Damage Class, 58 U.
KAN. L. REV. 845, 882 (2010).
118. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011).
119. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158–59 (1982).
120. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2559 (“While we have never held [that the absence of notice
and opt-out rights violate due process] where the monetary claims do not predominate, the
serious possibility that it may be so provides an additional reason not to read Rule 23(b)(2)
to include the monetary claims here.”); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812
(1985) (holding that, where claims are predominately for monetary damages, the Due
Process Clause requires the right to notice and opt out); Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982
F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the lack of an opportunity for the plaintiff to opt
out prevented the use of res judicata).
121. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 600–01, 606, 626–27 (1997); see
also AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a) (2010).
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Thus, identifying where counsel’s work fell short and second-guessing
those trade-offs may be impractical.
The second possibility for addressing aggregate harms that entail both
divisible and indivisible remedies is to limit the representation’s scope ex
ante, such that it includes only aggregate rights seeking indivisible
remedies.122 This should likewise limit the action’s preclusive effect to
aggregate harms, which means that a plaintiff seeking to relitigate those
questions would have to demonstrate that the inadequate representation
harmed the group as a whole. Intragroup conflicts would matter less. Yet,
if plaintiffs won the first suit, then subsequent individual suits seeking
divisible remedies could use issue preclusion offensively to avoid
relitigating questions over aggregate harms.
Granted, there are drawbacks to this ex ante approach. These drawbacks
center mainly on whether the first court can limit the scope of preclusion in
subsequent cases.123 After all, the core of claim preclusion—that plaintiffs
should bring all related claims in one action—is antithetical to the idea of
addressing only aggregate harms and indivisible relief collectively and then
allowing follow-on actions for divisible relief. This approach also runs up
against the maxim that a court “cannot conclusively determine the res
judicata effect of [its own] decision.”124 In Rule 23(b)(2) class actions,
courts have occasionally held that the class representative’s failure to
request compensatory damages alongside declaratory or injunctive relief
signals inadequate representation.125 Other courts have, however, decided
that splitting claims between individual and aggregate harms to facilitate
class certification of the latter is perfectly permissible.126
In his article titled, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, Professor
Tobias Wolff has persuasively argued the error of the preclusion maxim
122. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04(c)
(suggesting courts “authorize aggregate treatment of common issues concerning an
indivisible remedy . . . even though additional divisible remedies are also available that
warrant individual treatment or aggregate treatment with the opportunity of claimants to
exclude themselves”); Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 1073.
123. This is a matter of much confusion in lower court cases based primarily on the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867
(1984). For a helpful overview of this case as well as the entire problem, see Wolff, supra
note 1, at 724–31.
124. Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 243 (W.D. Tex.
1999); see also Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 220 F.R.D. 64, 80 (M.D. Tenn.
2004) (“Although thus declaring that the judgment in a class action includes the class, as
defined, subdivision (c)(3) does not disturb the recognized principle that the court
conducting the action cannot predetermine the res judicata effect of the judgment; this can
be tested only in a subsequent action.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (c)(3) advisory
committee’s note)).
125. E.g., Colindres v. QuietFlex Mfg., 235 F.R.D. 347, 375 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Zachery,
185 F.R.D. at 243.
126. See, e.g., Cameron v. Tomes, 990 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1993); Sullivan v. Chase Inv.
Servs. of Bos., Inc., 79 F.R.D. 246, 265 (N.D. Cal. 1978); see also Edward F. Sherman,
“Abandoned Claims” in Class Actions: Implications for Preclusion and Adequacy of
Counsel, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 483, 491–92 (2011).
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against a court determining the effect of its own decision.127 As he notes,
“[t]he most basic reform that is needed in this arena is for rendering fora to
recognize and claim their proper role as expositors of positive law in
assessing and controlling the preclusive effects of their own judgments.”128
Moreover, there is no theoretical basis or logical reason for this controlling
maxim.129
Although Professor Wolff suggests several tools for courts to employ, the
most important is Rule 41, which gives federal courts the ability to dismiss
claims without prejudice.130 As the Supreme Court recognized in Semtek
International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., this designation prevents
subsequent courts from affording any preclusive force to the dismissed
claims.131 Stated in terms of claim preclusion, dismissing a claim without
prejudice is not a dismissal on the merits and is thus not afforded a
preclusive effect.132 Likewise, in class actions, courts can use their Rule
23(e) authority to approve settlements that place careful constraints on
which claims are settled and which could be litigated in the future.133 Still,
until courts uniformly recognize the value of collectively litigating only
aggregate harms demanding indivisible remedies and leaving divisible
remedies to subsequent actions, some danger exists that the initial
aggregation will impede and preclude rather than facilitate successive
individual cases.134
C. Improving Adequacy in Aggregate Harms That Seek Indivisible
Remedies: “Notice and Comment”
Even if a rendering court can limit its judgment’s preclusive scope, this
framework paints a bleak picture for group members experiencing an
aggregate harm demanding an indivisible remedy. On the front end, group
members are not entitled to notice or an opportunity to be heard in Rule
23(b)(1) or (b)(2) actions, and most parens patriae statutes produce similar
results. This means that those affected by the judgment have no chance to
influence the litigation, shape the remedy, or participate in decision

127. Wolff, supra note 1, at 752–89.
128. Id. at 752.
129. Id. at 758–65, 767.
130. Id. at 758–64.
131. 531 U.S. 497, 506–09 (2001); Wolff, supra note 1, at 760–61.
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(b) (1982) (“[T]he general rule
[against splitting claims] does not apply [when] . . . [t]he court in the first action has
expressly reserved the plaintiff’s right to maintain the second action.”); see Wolff, supra
note 1, at 762.
133. Wolff, supra note 1, at 766 (citing Trotsky v. L.A. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 637, 646 (Ct. App. 1975)).
134. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 1073 (“But absent a clear doctrine on the res judicata
effect of a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, diligent plaintiffs’ counsel would have felt compelled
to assert all possible remedies for the class members for fear of waiving valuable individual
claims of some of the class members.”).

3068

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

making—all of which can impair the perception of procedural justice.135
On the back end, courts find intragroup conflicts over these matters trifling
and conclude that they are not sufficient reasons to unravel the litigation
through collateral attack.136
Granted, what these decisions lack in theoretical coherence, they make up
in pragmatic balancing. In many parens patriae and Rule 23(b)(2) cases,
the absent parties’ rights would be affected regardless of whether they were
a formal party to the suit because of the injunctive relief requested. If a city
decides to lift a curfew based on one person’s lawsuit, that decision affects
all residents equally—whether they were an actual party or not. The same
is true for school-busing cases, decisions to integrate nursing homes, and
remedies aimed at thwarting race and gender discrimination. Thus, these
res judicata results make sense in terms of real-world consequences and the
need to prevent conflicting decisions, though not in terms of consent and
identity of interests. Nevertheless, the theoretical shift towards pragmatism
seems to have written the Due Process Clause’s notion of adequacy out of
the equation.
How then can courts improve representational adequacy in pursuing
aggregate harms? The answer cannot come through preclusion because
tying group members to the result in these cases has clear practical benefits.
Otherwise, defendants might be faced with conflicting court opinions with
which they cannot possibly comply. So, the answer must lie at the front
end of litigation.
Where there can be only one uniform remedy that affects the entire
group, the answer must be to permit as many “inputs” as possible in
considering and fashioning that remedy.137 When the underlying harm is
aggregate, those affected by that harm should be notified of the pending
litigation and, after the court adjudicates liability, they should have the
chance to comment on and potentially influence the court’s remedy.138 As
the Supreme Court has recognized, adequate representation is not a
substitute for proper notice;139 notice, an opportunity to be heard, and
adequate representation are all cornerstones of due process.140
Notice and the opportunity to be heard have value even if the controlling
parties do not ultimately incorporate group members’ divergent views into

135. See Burch, supra note 64, at 7–11, 37–43.
136. See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Williams v. Lane, 96 F.R.D. 383, 386 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (“More important,
this Court can afford class members the opportunity to comment on the issue of relief if their
views on this subject are truly discordant.”).
138. See id.; see also Imasuen v. Moyer, No. 91 C 5425, 1992 WL 26705, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 7, 1992) (“Any differences of opinion within the class concerning the effect of proposed
remedies can be dealt with in the remedies aspect of the litigation, after the constitutionality
of the INS detention system has been adjudicated.”).
139. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974).
140. Granted, Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) do not require notice before foreclosing class
members’ rights and the Supreme Court approves those rules.
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the litigation’s resolution.141 Empirical studies on procedural justice
demonstrate that the simple opportunity to state one’s position to a decision
maker is independently valuable because those bound by the decision
Requiring participation
regard the outcome as more legitimate.142
opportunities where aggregate rights are at stake may also improve the
outcome. As Howard Reingold’s Smart Mobs, Jim Surowiecki’s Wisdom of
Crowds, and Scott Page’s The Difference have demonstrated through social
science, groups of diverse people can make accurate predictions, solve
problems, improve performance, and aggregate information.143 Thus,
providing notice and an opportunity to be heard in a mandatory class or
parens patriae action can lead to forceful advocacy that fosters welldeveloped arguments, increased legitimacy, and dissenters who are
ultimately more willing to accept the outcome.144 In this sense, conflict and
dissonance are beneficial; they encourage novel solutions, diverse ideas,
and creative problem solving.145 As game theorists demonstrate, increased
participation and bargaining—more “trades”—promotes more solutions.146
Accordingly, the more initial disagreement about what is important and
how to fashion an appropriate remedy, the better.
The feasibility of allowing notice and comment opportunities vary based
on the procedural mechanism used to aggregate claims. Currently, notice is
permitted but not required in mandatory classes that proceed under Rule
23(b)(1) or (b)(2). Likewise, some but not all parens patriae statutes
California’s antitrust statute uses commendable,
require notice.147
exemplary language:
In any action brought under this section, the Attorney General shall, at
any time, in any manner, and with any content as the court may direct,
141. See Burch, supra note 64, at 37–38.
142. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
102–03 (1988); E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental
and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
952 (1990); Linda Musante et al., The Effects of Control on Perceived Fairness of
Procedures and Outcomes, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 223, 237–38 (1983).
143. See generally SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY
CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2007); HOWARD REINGOLD,
SMART MOBS: THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION (2002); JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF
CROWDS (2004).
144. See W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE PARADOX OF MASS POLITICS: KNOWLEDGE AND
OPINION IN THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE 126–27 (1986); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts
in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1223–24 (1982).
145. Lisa Troyer & Reef Youngreen, Conflict and Creativity in Groups, 65 J. SOC. ISSUES
409, 413 (2009).
146. See generally HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982).
147. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(1) (2006) (federal antitrust statute requiring courts to
give notice of parens patriae actions by publication); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.577(e) (2012)
(Alaska’s version of the parens patriae antitrust statute, which requires notice and opt-out
rights); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-212 (2011) (requiring notice for Arkansas’s Unfair Practices
Act); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16760(b)(1) (West 2008). Some statutes have also created
opt-out rights for parens patriae actions. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.577(e); CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE § 16760(b)(2).
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cause notice thereof to be given by publication. If the court finds that
notice given solely by publication would deny due process of law to any
person or persons, the court may direct further notice to the person or
persons according to the circumstances of the case.148

This kind of language gives courts the flexibility to ensure that notice is not
cost prohibitive, but authorizes them to require additional notice if
individual property interests are at stake. In sum, providing notice to
affected parties (whether through Rule 23’s built in procedures for (b)(1) or
(b)(2) claims, or by statute for parens patriae suits) increases the legitimacy
of the outcome in mandatory actions.
III. APPLYING THE AGGREGATE-RIGHTS FRAMEWORK TO
ALTERNATIVE COLLECTIVE PROCEDURES
As we have seen, although threads of both consent and overlapping
interests underpin many modern-day cases, those theories fail to explain
how courts can legitimately bind dissenters in mandatory litigation, such as
a traditional Rule 23(b)(2) class. When class members collaterally attack
the class settlement and claim that they were inadequately represented,
courts frequently dismiss those allegations without offering a coherent
rationale. The aggregate-rights framework set forth in Part II, which
suggests that courts should differentiate between inadequate representation
claims based on the underlying right at stake, provides an alterative means
for courts to evaluate and understand those claims. That framework’s use,
however, is not limited solely to Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) cases. It can also
help alleviate similar dilemmas in class-action alternatives, such as parens
patriae suits and multidistrict litigation. Accordingly, this part explains this
framework’s utility in these alternative contexts.
A. Parens Patriae
As class actions have become increasingly difficult to certify149 and
courts enforce arbitration clauses that prohibit aggregating claims,150
scholars have urged states’ attorneys general to step in and sue on behalf of
their citizens using their parens patriae authority.151 This not only avoids
arbitration and rigorous class certification standards, but may also prevent
private attorneys from siphoning off a hefty chunk of citizens’ damages for
their attorneys’ fees.152 Yet, parens patriae actions, which are not subject
148. CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 16760(b)(1).
149. See Burch, supra note 4.
150. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
151. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of
Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1919 (2000); Myriam Gilles & Gary
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012).
152. See Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1848–49
(2000). Yet, state attorneys general often hire private class action counsel to bring these
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to Rule 23’s class certification criteria, are a double-edged sword. Not
subjecting these actions to stringent certification standards means that they
are easier to bring and may thus be more successful in deterring
wrongdoing. But it also means that there is no judicial check on adequate
representation as there would be in a class action.153 This, in turn, means
that the preclusive scope of the judgment is uncertain at best, particularly
when an attorney general sues for both indivisible and divisible remedies.
Nevertheless, the aggregate-rights framework can enhance clarity when
judging the preclusive force of parens patriae actions. Traditional parens
patriae cases involve aggregate rights where the state sues to vindicate its
citizens’ public interest. So, for example, when a state sues another state
for the right to divert and use water, the resulting judgment binds both the
state and its citizens.154 The same result should be true when a state sues to
establish public transit system fares,155 implement a federal wildlifemanagement statute,156 or determine whether a cellular company can build
its towers.157 In Lucas v. Planning Board, where citizens sued after the
municipality entered into an agreement to permit a cellular company to
construct its towers, the court explained that the town adequately
represented its residents because “[t]he interests asserted [in the prior
litigation] were of an exclusively public character.”158
In many ways, however, these are straightforward cases under the
aggregate-rights framework—they involve aggregate rights and request
indivisible relief. As the court in Lucas put it, the citizens had “no private
interests or individual rights that extend[ed] beyond the general public
interest asserted by the Town.”159 Thus, there was no reason to doubt the
preclusive force of the first case “since ‘governments are by their nature
representative of the cumulative rights of private citizens.’”160 The public’s
interest is diffuse and the rights asserted were clearly aggregate rights.
Accordingly, any sort of harm from inadequate representation would be
unindividuated among group members, which means that the court properly
evaluated the representation in group terms. Because the relief requested is
indivisible, pragmatism suggests that multiple actions could lead to
conflicting obligations.

actions, so the cost savings for plaintiffs may not be as great as anticipated. See, e.g., Gilles
& Friedman, supra note 151, at 672.
153. See Lemos, supra note 2, at 535–42.
154. Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 506–07, 509 (1932) (“[T]he decree must be
taken as determining the relative rights of the two States, including their respective citizens,
to divert and use the waters of the Laramie and its tributaries.”).
155. Berman v. Denver Tramway Corp., 197 F.2d 946, 951 (10th Cir. 1952).
156. Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 1998).
157. Lucas v. Planning Bd., 7 F. Supp. 2d 310, 328–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
158. Id. at 328.
159. Id. at 329.
160. Id. (quoting 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4458, at 521 (1984)).
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The preclusive scope of parens patriae actions asserting individual rights
and seeking damages on behalf of those individuals should be equally clear.
Preclusion should not attach to a judgment where: a structural conflict161
exists between the attorney general’s and the citizen’s interests, the attorney
general failed to prosecute the lawsuit, or the attorney general lacked a
motive to pursue the case vigorously.162 In its 1961 ruling in Sam Fox
Publishing Co. v. United States,163 the Supreme Court explained that “[w]e
regard it as fully settled that a person whose private interests coincide with
the public interest in government antitrust litigation is nonetheless not
bound by the eventuality of such litigation, and hence may not, as of right,
intervene in it.”164 In the antitrust area in particular, the Court explained,
“private and public actions were designed to be cumulative, not mutually
exclusive,” because “[d]ifferent policy considerations govern each of
these.”165 Moreover, when individual rights are at stake, “due-process
questions may arise, such as whether citizens are entitled to notice and to
exclude themselves and whether a process for distributing damages to
individuals must be established.”166
The harder cases are those where the character of the underlying action
involves both public questions and private rights. The Supreme Court has
been enigmatic in this area. Currently, as parens patriae, the state can seek
compensation for sovereign or quasi-sovereign claims, but it must have an
interest that is distinct from individual citizens’ interests.167 As courts have
recognized, the Supreme Court has not defined “quasi-sovereign”
interests,168 but “it is clear that a state may sue to protect its citizens against
‘the pollution of the air over its territory; or of interstate waters in which the
state has rights.’”169 Yet, states cannot “sue to assert the rights of private
individuals.”170 Nevertheless, states do not limit their authority to welltraveled “quasi-sovereign” interests like environmental and antitrust
enforcement. Rather, they have asserted their parens patriae authority with
varying degrees of success in bringing litigation against tobacco
161. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
162. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 cmt.
b(1)(B) (2010).
163. 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961).
164. Id. at 689 (quoting United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954)).
165. Id.
166. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 cmt.
b(1)(B).
167. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982); 13B
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD R. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3531.11 (3d ed. 2008).
168. As one commentator observed, “‘Quasi-sovereign’ is one of those loopy concepts
that comes along often enough to remind us that appellate courts sometimes lose their
moorings and drift off into the ether. It is a meaningless term absolutely bereft of utility.”
Ratliff, supra note 152, at 1851.
169. Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1469 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting
12 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 350.02[3], at 3-20 (1993)).
170. Id.; see also Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600.
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companies,171 lead paint manufacturers,172 gun manufacturers, and health
maintenance organizations.173
Adequate representation and preclusion in these in-between cases—
where the underlying action involves both public questions and private
rights—can be addressed by either limiting the scope of attorneys general’s
parens patriae authority or by not precluding a subsequent citizen suit when
the right in question is an individual harm and a structural conflict exists.
First, the Court could clarify the scope of a state’s parens patriae
authority. By limiting the types of claims a state can assert on behalf of a
private individual ex ante, the courts would likewise limit the preclusive
force of those judgments. If an attorney general could pursue only
aggregate rights and she instead litigated claims involving individual harms,
then the individual claims should not be precluded in a subsequent case.
But several problems exist with limiting the attorneys general’s authority
ex ante. First, as Professor Myriam Gilles and Gary Friedman have pointed
out, the parens patriae action may be one of the last possibilities for
enforcing consumer protection, antitrust, and employment laws in the wake
of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes.174 As they advocate, attorneys general should “redress the injuries
of consumers and employees who would otherwise have no recourse in a
post-Concepcion world.”175
Yet, even if attorneys general are allowed to collect damages on behalf of
individuals, there is often no requirement that they distribute those damages
to the affected citizens.176 As Gilles and Friedman note, “[l]iberal use of cy
pres, escheatment to the public fisc, and the application of rough justice
principles in distributing awards are unquestioned hallmarks of parens
patriae litigation.”177 Consequently, limiting parens patriae authority to
the pursuit of purely aggregate rights might strike a fair balance. On one
hand, it would allow the state to skirt arbitration provisions and classcertification standards in enforcing aggregate rights, including those private
interests that rise to a “quasi-sovereign” level when sufficiently

171. See, e.g., Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962 (E.D. Tex. 1997); R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Richard P.
Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and
the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859 (2000).
172. E.g., State v. Lead Indus. Assoc., Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 435 (R.I. 2008) (explaining
that the state could not pursue a public-nuisance claim against the defendants because it
could not prove that the defendants “interfered with a public right”).
173. Ratliff, supra note 152, at 1847.
174. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 151, at 623.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 665 n.193 (citing, for example, California’s Cartwright Act which allows the
attorney general to distribute monetary relief “[i]n any manner as the superior court . . . may
authorize [so long as] . . . each person be afforded a reasonable opportunity to secure his or
her appropriate portion of the monetary relief”).
177. Id. at 666.

3074

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

aggregated.178 On the other, it would allow individuals to ride on the
state’s coattails and perhaps even use offensive nonmutual issue preclusion
to vindicate their individual rights. The second remaining difficulty with
this ex ante approach, however, is in defining the limits of parens patriae
authority in a meaningful way, a problem that we will revisit in exploring
the second potential solution.
The second possibility for addressing these in-between cases involving
public questions and private rights is to apply the aggregate-rights
framework in assessing subsequent claims of inadequate representation.
That is, where purely aggregate rights are concerned, the attorney general is
presumed an adequate representative and courts should tolerate greater
intragroup conflicts.179 But where individual rights are at stake, plaintiffs
should have the chance to collaterally attack the judgment if a structural
conflict existed, if the distribution of divisible remedies was inequitable, if
the attorney general lacked a sufficient motive to pursue the case
vigorously, or if the attorney general performed inadequately in prosecuting
the case.180 This would allow attorneys general to continue to pursue a
wide array of actions that might otherwise fall through the cracks in the
wake of Dukes and Concepcion, but would preserve citizens’ individual
right to sue where the harm or relief requested overlaps with private,
individual rights and the attorney general’s representation fell short.
To further explain, as the beginning of this section noted, the easy cases
are those in which the underlying right is one with a predominately public
character, such as implementing a wildlife-management statute or
establishing public transit system fares. To return to the notions of consent
and interest representation, precluding subsequent litigation in cases
involving aggregate rights satisfies both traditional theories. Because most
attorneys general are elected and must serve the public’s interest,181 consent
might be satisfied through any number of social-contract theories focusing
178. Lemos, supra note 2, at 493.
179. This approach has the benefit of roughly aligning with current court decisions on
preclusion in parens patriae actions. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,
458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982); Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1468–70 (10th
Cir. 1993); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549, 551 (Ga. 2006)
(“The State can, as parens patriae, maintain an action on behalf of its citizens to seek
compensation for sovereign or quasi-sovereign claims, but it may not represent its citizens’
private interests. This means that the State and its citizens can be privies only with regard to
public claims; they cannot be privies with regard to private claims.”).
180. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 cmt.
b(1)(B) (2010). This differs from a proposal put forward by Maggie Lemos, which
suggested that courts hold “that state suits cannot preclude private actions for damages
(whether individual or aggregate).” Lemos, supra note 2, at 546. The proposal I set forth
would give attorneys general the opportunity to represent private individuals when their
claims overlap with collective harms.
181. Lemos, supra note 2, at 489 n.7 (“Forty-three states provide for popular election of
the attorney general. In the remaining states, the attorney general is appointed by the
legislature (Maine), by the state supreme court (Tennessee), or by the governor (Alaska,
Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming).”).
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on the consent of the governed such as John Locke’s tacit consent,182
Immanuel Kant’s hypothetical consent,183 or even John Rawls’s notion of
what we would agree to behind a veil of ignorance.184 Interests roughly
align, too. Serving the public interest is in the attorney general’s best
interest––the press can easily keep tabs on public actions, ambitious
attorneys general eyeing other elected positions must keep the public
satisfied, and citizen stakeholders will complain openly if displeased.185
But when attorneys general bring borderline cases involving “quasisovereign” interests with public and private dimensions, we run into
essentially the same problem that we faced with limiting the scope of the
attorney general’s authority ex ante: how to define aggregate rights. The
difference is that challenging the representation ex post has several benefits.
First, it allows difficult procedural cases to proceed without the
impediments created by class-certification standards or arbitration clauses.
Second, it gives the attorney general an opportunity to pursue public
questions and related private rights in tandem. Third, if that representation
proves lacking, particularly with regard to private rights, it gives citizens a
chance to initiate those claims in a subsequent action. Nevertheless, the
chief concern is over what constitutes an aggregate right. Here we can rely
again on the basic aggregate-rights framework laid out in Part II.A to
differentiate between aggregate and individual harms.
Punitive damages once again provide an illustrative example. Instead of
examining them in the Title VII context, however, consider their role in the
tobacco litigation brought by multiple states’ attorneys general. After a
number of states’ attorneys general sued the tobacco companies for
violating various consumer-protection laws, engaging in deceptive and
misleading conduct that wronged the public, unjustly enriching themselves
with taxpayer money that went to treat smokers’ health problems, and
wrongfully profiting at the public’s expense,186 they reached a master
settlement agreement. The settlement contained a broad release that
covered claims by states acting as parens patriae as well as private
attorneys general and taxpayers to “the extent that any such person or entity
is seeking relief on behalf of or generally applicable to the general public
. . . as opposed to solely private or individual relief for separate and distinct
injuries.”187 It defined “released claims” to include “liabilities of any
nature including civil penalties and punitive damages.”188 So, when private
182. See generally LOCKE, supra note 44, at 365.
183. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
55 (H.J. Paton ed. trans., Hutchinson & Co. Ltd. 1962) (1785).
184. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
185. This is true even when the attorney general hires private counsel to pursue the
action. Brunet, supra note 151, at 1932–34. But see Lemos, supra note 2, at 488.
186. Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51 DEPAUL L.
REV. 331, 337–40 (2001).
187. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549, 551 (Ga. 2006).
188. Id.
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parties later sued for compensatory and punitive damages, the tobacco
companies claimed that punitive damages remedied a public harm and were
thus precluded.189
Not surprisingly, courts considering individuals’ subsequent tobacco
lawsuits reached conflicting opinions over whether punitive damages were
a matter of public interest and thus remedied an aggregate harm.190 These
conflicts centered principally on each state’s punitive damage law. On one
hand, some courts have reasoned that their state law uses punitive damages
to deter wrongful conduct, punish misbehavior for the public good, and thus
benefit the general public, not private parties.191 As one court observed in
response to a plaintiff’s claim that she retained “some private interest in
punitive damages,” that argument “conflicts with the purpose of punitive
damages in New York, since ‘enforcement of an award of punitive damages
as a purely private remedy would violate strong public policy.’”192 In that
sense, punitive damages do not remedy an individual harm; instead, they
punish wrongdoers and deter others from engaging in that conduct—
remedies designed to protect the public as a whole. This concept is further
reflected in certain state statutes that require a percentage of punitive
damages awarded to go to the state’s treasury193 as well as by some states’
criteria that plaintiffs demonstrate “grave misconduct affecting the public
generally” as opposed to just an “individually sustained wrong.”194
Other states have reached the opposite conclusion when faced with the
same question of whether the tobacco settlement precludes subsequent
individual punitive damage claims. California, for instance, uses a
“primary rights” test in assessing res judicata, which means that courts
examine the harm suffered and bar subsequent actions only when they arise
out of “the same injury to the same right.”195 In the tobacco cases, an
individual’s punitive damage claim arises out of her own personal and
emotional injuries, not the economic harms and anticompetitive activities
189. See, e.g., id. at 551–52; Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382,
392 (Ct. App. 2011).
190. Compare Bullock, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 392 (permitting an individual plaintiff to
recover punitive damages), with Gault, 627 S.E.2d at 551–52 (precluding an individual
plaintiff from recovering punitive damages). As the Supreme Court has noted, “A basic
principle of federalism is that each State may make its own reasoned judgment about what
conduct is permitted or proscribed within its borders, and each State alone can determine
what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant who acts within its
jurisdiction.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
191. Grill v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 2d 481, 498 (S.D.N.Y 2009); Clinton
v. Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 639, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Gault,
627 S.E.2d at 552; Shea v. Am. Tobacco Co., 73 A.D.3d 730, 732 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010);
Fabiano v. Philip Morris Inc., 54 A.D.3d 146, 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
192. Clinton, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 653 (quoting Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. 353 N.E.2d 793,
794 (N.Y. 1976)).
193. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2000) (requiring 75 percent of punitive
damages awarded to be paid into the State treasury).
194. Fabiano, 54 A.D.3d at 150.
195. Bullock, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 392.
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that the attorney general pursued as parens patriae.196 Thus, punitive
damage claims arise out of a plaintiff’s individual harm.
These two distinct approaches to characterizing punitive damage claims
should likewise lead to alternative results if a citizen claimed that the
attorney general inadequately represented her in pursuing that claim. When
punitive damages benefit the public as a whole by deterring wrongful
conduct and punishing wrongdoers, an individual’s subsequent claim that
the attorney general inadequately represented her in litigating that remedy
should fall on deaf ears. In this instance, courts should measure the
representation’s fairness in group terms since punitive damages are
unindividuated among group members.
Representation would be
inadequate only if the attorney general colluded with the defendant, failed
to zealously prosecute the claim, or otherwise injured the group qua group.
Conversely, if California had not decided to prohibit preclusion of
punitive damages ex ante—through its definition of primary rights—then it
might reach the same result using the aggregate-rights framework. For
example, if punitive damages compensated individual victims of an
aggregate harm, the attorney general could still request them (and distribute
them among the victims), but citizens would have more latitude and a larger
arsenal to demonstrate inadequate representation. Consequently, an
individual could relitigate punitive damages if a structural conflict existed,
if the monetary distribution was inequitable, if the attorney general lacked a
sufficient motive to zealously litigate the case, or if the attorney general
failed to competently prosecute the lawsuit.
B. Multidistrict Litigation
The circumstances of multidistrict litigation create unusual litigation
relationships that serve to complicate inadequate representation claims. The
first relationship is between the attorney and the client, a seemingly
traditional pairing based on consent through a retainer agreement. Yet,
attorneys typically represent many clients with roughly similar claims
against the same defendant to capitalize on economies of scale and recoup
their litigation investment.197 That means that the traditional attorney-client
relationship, where the client monitors her attorney’s performance is a
fiction; her fate is tied to that of many others and learning her own lawsuit’s
status tells her little about how the litigation as a whole is faring. The
second, even more attenuated relationship is between the client and the
plaintiffs’ steering committee—the court-appointed attorneys who direct
and control the litigation for efficiency’s sake. The final relationship is

196. Id. at 393.
197. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers As Monitors in Aggregate Litigation,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1288–92 (2012).
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between the directly retained attorneys and the plaintiffs’ steering
committee, a relationship that this Article does not consider.198
1. Attorney-Client Relationship
Because the first relationship, between the attorney and her clients, is far
more attenuated in the context of multidistrict litigation than a conventional
attorney-client relationship and the attorney represents many clients who
may have conflicting interests, there is a real potential for inadequate
representation. As Part II.A explained, in a mass-tort case, just as in an
individual-rights case, a plaintiff could prove her underlying malpractice
claim without referencing other plaintiffs. Likewise, no question exists as
to who receives the remedy: the individual plaintiff. Yet, because of the
tendency toward centralization,199 a subsequent inadequate representation
claim (though it tends to take the form of a direct attack via attorney
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty,200 a bar complaint, or even criminal
conspiracy to commit fraud201) is more likely to rely on evidence of how
the attorney treated other clients as proof of malfeasance.
Because this representation falls into the middle of the spectrum of
individual versus aggregate rights, it cannot be explained wholly by consent
or interest representation. Although clients must give their informed
consent when attorneys represent multiple claimants in the same litigation,
as I have explored in detail elsewhere, they are sometimes unable to obtain
any meaningful information about potential conflicts until a settlement offer
is on the table.202 And though the attorney must act in the best interests of
the group as a whole, that could mean sacrificing one client’s interest to
further the others’.203
Nevertheless, because clients individually retain their attorneys, consent
remains the operating principle. Accordingly, most proposals for rectifying
inadequate representation focus on shoring up consent at the beginning of
the litigation process rather than mending the preclusive effect of a
judgment ex post. Because I have proposed several reforms in previous
articles, I will simply mention them here alongside other commentators’
198. For an in-depth article discussing this relationship between the plaintiffs’ steering
committee and directly hired (“disabled”) attorneys, see Silver, supra note 2.
199. Burch, supra note 4.
200. See, e.g., Johnson v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 660 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2011)
(alleging breach of fiduciary duties against the plaintiffs’ former law firm for convincing the
plaintiffs to waive their claims and entering into an agreement to work for the defendant—a
nonwaivable conflict of interest).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 679 F.3d 355, 365–66 (6th Cir. 2012)
(involving the government’s indictment of three Kentucky lawyers who misallocated
settlement funds in the Kentucky fen-phen litigation).
202. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus, Individual Consent, 79 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 506, 514–16 (2011).
203. See, e.g., Burch, supra note 73, at 98 (describing Betty Mekdeci’s situation in the
Bendectin litigation where attorneys refused to relitigate her case so that they could bring
stronger cases first).
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ideas to situate them in the context of this aggregate-rights framework.
Ideas for bolstering informed consent include providing market solutions
that allow third-party financiers to play the role of an informed
intermediary;204 coaxing attorneys to identify conflicts at the litigation’s
outset and either limiting the size or diversity of their clients or supplying
better information to them;205 encouraging the judge to decipher internal
conflicts and appoint alternative counsel when the circumstances warrant
it;206 and improving communication between the court and the litigants as
well as between the litigants themselves.207 In addition, there have been
proposals that would allow attorneys to embed a voting clause in clients’
retainer agreements, which would bind all clients to a settlement if a
substantial majority agreed to it.208 Others have proposed utilizing
intraclaimant governance agreements, which would allow the clients to
create a similar voting structure after they have the opportunity to
communicate with one another and determine if substantial conflicts exist
between them.209 Both of these latter proposals include a judicial failsafe,
albeit with varying degrees of protection.210
2. Client–Lead Attorney Relationships
Although consent dominates the relationship between attorneys and their
directly retained clients, the same cannot be said for the relationship
between plaintiffs and the plaintiffs’ steering committee or other lead
lawyers. No individual attorney-client relationship exists between the lead
attorneys and most plaintiffs in a multidistrict litigation, so plaintiffs have
no say in who is appointed and no way to fire or discipline those who act
contrary to their interests.211 As Professors Silver and Miller have

204. Burch, supra note 197.
205. See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client
Autonomy in Non-class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519; Nancy J.
Moore, Ethical Issues in Mass Tort Plaintiffs’ Representation: Beyond the Aggregate
Settlement Rule, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3233 (2013).
206. See, e.g., In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 769 F. Supp. 2d 650 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (appointing special counsel for the plaintiffs represented by Napoli Bern because the
firm had conflicting obligations to other clients in the aggregate litigation).
207. See, e.g., Burch, supra note 73, at 117–21; Kenneth R. Feinberg, Democratization of
Mass Litigation: Empowering the Beneficiaries, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 481, 485
(2012); Jack B. Weinstein, The Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 457–60 (2012); cf. Robert H. Klonoff et al., Making Class
Actions Work: The Untapped Potential of the Internet, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 727 (2008).
208. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.17(b)
(2010).
209. Burch, supra note 73, at 132–34. For a comparison of this proposal with the ALI’s
proposal, see Burch, supra note 202.
210. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.18;
Burch, supra note 73, at 132–34.
211. Silver, supra note 2, at 1986.
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observed, “[j]udges appoint the lawyers who run MDLs on the plaintiffs’
side” but “[t]heir choices can be puzzling:”212
[J]udges sometimes give lead positions to lawyers with few or no clients
in an MDL, passing over other lawyers whose clients number in the
hundreds or thousands. Judges also wield the appointment power with
unfettered discretion. They need not explain why they choose some
lawyers rather than others, and rarely do. They face no known risk of
appellate review or reversal: no appointment decision seems ever to have
been challenged, much less reversed.213

The settlements that usually result from multidistrict litigation are likewise
unassailable since they rely on plaintiffs’ consent, however coerced it may
be.214
The insular nature of these lead-counsel assignments is not healthy for
judicial legitimacy. Neither consent215 nor identity of interests currently
justifies these appointments. Despite having a fiduciary duty to the
plaintiffs, when an attorney assumes a lead role in a multidistrict litigation
and has no actual clients involved in the case, the attorney is likely to feel
beholden to the judge.216 Certain attorneys gain reputations for building
consensus, making trouble, or being patsies. If a judge feels that the lead
attorneys are not moving settlement discussions along quickly enough,217
then she is not likely to bestow lead positions upon those attorneys in the
future and may well communicate their “failings” to other multidistrict
litigation judges. Moreover, lead attorneys’ obligations are far from
concrete.218 Although courts have remarked that lead counsel represent “all
212. See Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 109; see also In re Aircrash Disaster at Malaga,
Spain on Sept. 13, 1982, 769 F. Supp. 90, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The court has the
responsibility of appointing the Committee, authorizing its functions and structure, and
supervising its work.”).
213. Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 109.
214. See Burch, supra note 4.
215. As Professor Silver describes, attorneys in the Guidant and Vioxx multidistrict
litigation did sign form contracts with the lead attorneys, but those contracts were coerced on
the front end and their terms were not enforced after settlement; rather, the judge awarded
the lead attorneys more generous fees than those provided for contractually. Silver, supra
note 2, at 1992. The argument for consent then would be that plaintiffs retained agents to act
on their behalf and those agents then entered into contractual agreements, which bound their
principals.
216. See In re Aircrash Disaster, 769 F. Supp. at 91 (“The court has the responsibility of
appointing the Committee, authorizing its functions and structure, and supervising its work.
The Committee therefore owes a duty to plaintiffs as well as to the court.”); Silver, supra
note 2, at 1992 (arguing that a fiduciary duty exists between lead lawyers and the plaintiffs
as a whole).
217. Some judges make this requirement explicit. See, e.g., In re Aircrash Disaster, 769
F. Supp. at 91 (“Indeed, the May 25 Order signed by Magistrate Caden states that ‘[t]he
Plaintiffs Committee and all plaintiffs’ attorneys shall cooperate among themselves and with
defense counsel to expeditiously and economically conclude all liability matters and avoid
unnecessary motions and Court proceedings.’” (alteration in original)).
218. See Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918,
931 n.50 (1995).
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plaintiffs”219 or “owe[] a duty to plaintiffs”220 and commentators have
argued that they are fiduciaries to the claimants,221 even if those
propositions were unassailable, they would tell us little about how lead
attorneys should approach intragroup conflicts.
Because inadequate representation claims are impractical given the
impossibility of appellate review and plaintiffs “consent” to a settlement,222
one key reform is needed––judges should issue a reasoned opinion
appointing attorneys to lead-counsel positions based on their alignment with
identifiable interests among the plaintiff class. In particular, judges should
look for “structural conflicts.” That is, a conflict of interest either between
the “claimants and the lawyers who would represent claimants on an
aggregate basis” or “among the claimants themselves that would present a
significant risk that the lawyers for claimants might skew systematically the
conduct of the litigation so as to favor some claimants over others on
grounds aside from reasoned evaluation of their respective claims or to
disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers themselves.”223 If a
structural conflict exists or arises during the litigation, the court should
ensure that the subgroup has its own representative on the plaintiffs’
steering committee.
Even though the inevitability of settlement makes the prospect of
appealing the order slim, it still has several advantages. An order forces the
judge to explain her selection rationale, consider what potential intragroup
conflicts might exist, appoint counsel to represent those competing interests
(much like an attorney would represent a subclass in a class action), and
create a record, should allegations of inadequate representation by lead
counsel subsequently arise. Moreover, the opinion-writing process itself
acts as a check on decision making: if the reasoning seems dubious when
articulated on paper, then perhaps the judge will reconsider.224
Assuming this change is in place and that a plaintiff is able to have the
opinion reviewed by an appellate court—all very difficult assumptions
given the inevitability of settlement—how should the appellate court
consider these individual challenges? After all, simply claiming that the
plaintiffs’ steering committee has a duty to represent all plaintiffs fails to
219. In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 888 F.2d 940, 942 (1st Cir. 1989)
(“The [Plaintiffs Steering Committee], as the district court observed, represents ‘by its very
nature . . . all plaintiffs.’” (quoting the lower court)).
220. In re Aircrash Disaster, 769 F. Supp. at 91.
221. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.04
reporter’s notes cmt. a (2010); Silver, supra note 2, at 1987–91.
222. See Burch, supra note 202, at 512–14; Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 65.
223. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a)(1).
224. See Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function,
96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1302 (2008); Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They
Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1447–48 (1995) (“Reasoning that seemed sound when ‘in
the head’ may seem half-baked when written down, especially since the written form of an
argument encourages some degree of critical detachment in the writer, who in reading what
he has written will be wondering how an audience would react.”).
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account for the very real likelihood of conflicts. For example, although it
proceeded as a class action, multidistrict litigation claimants might face
similar conflicts to those in the Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc. heart valve
settlement.225 In discussing Bowling, Professor Jay Tidmarsh explained,
“Those in immediate need of [a heart-valve removal] were unlikely to
benefit from the research and development fund, and might well have
preferred higher payments for [removal] costs,” yet “[n]o special
representation was provided.”226 If a situation like this—where claimants
required immediate heart-valve removal—presented itself in multidistrict
litigation and no lead lawyer specifically represented those claimants’
unique interests when negotiating an aggregate settlement, those plaintiffs
could feel they were inadequately represented.
This is where the aggregate-rights framework can play a role. In general,
multidistrict litigations that are not certified as class actions involve
individual as opposed to aggregate rights.227 Nevertheless, in the context of
the heart-valve hypothetical, a claim that the steering committee
inadequately represented a heart-valve removal plaintiff would have groupbased characteristics in that it could not be proven without referencing the
representation of other plaintiffs. Yet, counsel cannot disprove the claim
simply by showing that she treated the rest of the group fairly. Moreover,
not all claimants are harmed equally by the inadequate representation; some
benefit. Consequently, the harm is to the individual and the court should
assess the representation using the more generous structural conflicts
inquiry.
CONCLUSION
As litigants move away from conventional aggregation through class
actions, questions about adequate representation and preclusion have
proliferated. This confusion is due in part to a muddled, historical thesis for
group litigation. Even the class action does not always make sense in terms
of consent and identity of interests. Consequently, this Article has
endeavored to construct a practical framework that courts can use to address
inadequate representation across a variety of aggregate litigation forms—
from traditional class actions to parens patriae cases to multidistrict
litigation.
This aggregate-rights framework recommends that subsequent courts
evaluate claims of unfair, inadequate representation differently, depending
on whether the underlying substantive right is aggregate or individual.
225. 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992). This kind of litigation would likely proceed as
multidistrict litigation rather than a class action if litigated today.
226. JAY TIDMARSH, MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES 43
(1998).
227. If an aggregate right is at stake and litigation is pending in both state and federal
courts, then there is a real possibility for conflicting judgments to yield incompatible
obligations.
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When group litigation adjudicates individual rights, the collectivization is
merely a tool for convenience and efficiency; it does not change the nature
of the underlying right into a group right. Consequently, the individual
must either consent to the conflict (when counsel represents many
individuals collectively) or the court must take measures to prevent
structural conflicts. If neither condition is fulfilled, then, on collateral
attack, courts should evaluate inadequate representation claims to determine
whether there was a “significant risk that the lawyers for claimants might
skew systematically the conduct of the litigation so as to favor some
claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned evaluation of their
respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers
themselves.”228
In contrast, when aggregate rights are at stake, affected individuals
should receive notice and the opportunity to voice their opinions about how
the court should fashion a remedy. When the underlying claim accrues
from an aggregate harm, if counsel inadequately represented one group
member, then she failed not just one member, but the whole group.
Because each group member benefits from (or is harmed by) indivisible
relief equally, no member has the right to an independent judgment.229 It
likewise makes sense that when counsel or a class representative bungles
that effort, the group experiences inadequate representation equally.230
Thus, courts should and do tolerate greater conflicts among group members
in these situations. Successful inadequate representation claims tend to be
those where the lawyers and, potentially, the named representatives acted
contrary to the whole group’s best interests or tried to represent an
overinclusive group in which some would require an alternative remedy
that the representative had no self-interested reason to litigate.

228. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a)(1)(B).
229. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 1059.
230. See id. at 1058 (“[I]n cases for injunctive relief against institutional conduct, it is
difficult to conceptualize an individual right of autonomy, even where we would no doubt
recognize an individual’s ability to bring a claim in court. In such circumstances, an
individual may be an exemplar of the harm visited by allegedly wrongful institutional
conduct, but that same individual cannot claim an autonomous right to separate control of
the outcome of the legal challenge.”).

